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BOOK REVIEWS

A COMING CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. OVER TAIWAN
Lewis, John Wilson, and Xue Litai. Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War. Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford Univ. Press, 2006. 377pp. $60

This sophisticated Chinese-language research, based on numerous original
sources and interviews, completes
Lewis and Xue’s authoritative series on
China’s military development. Other
books in the series, all published by
Stanford University Press, are China’s
Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force
Modernization in the Nuclear Age (1994),
Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the
Korean War (1993), and China Builds
the Bomb (1988).
In this fourth and final volume, the authors (both scholars affiliated with Stanford) begin by surveying Chinese
military culture and history. Among
their findings is that as part of a larger
effort to exploit military tension with
Moscow to further his personal power,
in 1969 Marshal Lin Biao placed China’s
nuclear forces on “full alert” (an action
both unprecedented and, thus far,
unrepeated) without Mao Zedong’s approval or knowledge. Such assertions
should be weighed against other information as it emerges. Lingering uncertainties are hardly the fault of the
authors, however, because, as they point
out, “no [Chinese] Party, military, or
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state contemporary security-related archives have been opened up to the general
citizenry, let alone foreign scholars.”
Part Two elucidates China’s military
decision making. A key finding is that
China’s national command authority
resides with the Politburo Standing
Committee even during “the most intense crises involving armed threats and
military deployments” but that it transfers to the Party’s Central Military
Commission in war. Untested in battle
since 1979 (against Vietnam), the dynamics of these complex bureaucracies
remain uncertain even after this penetrating analysis.
The third part examines China’s recent
efforts to modernize its strategic rocket
forces and air force. Efforts to improve
strategic missile command, mobility,
and survivability appear to have been
partially tested in the 1995–1996 crossStrait crisis and in subsequent exercises.
The authors’ earlier assertion that China’s
current doctrine of “‘active defense’ can
justify preemption even before the enemy has struck because the enemy intended to strike first” raises troubling
questions about China’s stated policy of
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no first use of nuclear weapons (NFU).
Indeed, the authors demonstrate that,
alarmed at the prospect of a conventional attack on its strategic infrastructure, China’s military planners have
recently revisited NFU. This, and lingering problems with military aviation
(despite the catalyst of the 1991 Gulf
War, subsequent Russian imports, and
incremental domestic progress), have
caused Beijing to seek additional deterrence through a growing arsenal of conventional missiles.

The military history of China has become a common element in the professional reading of many American
military officers. Journals like this one
have included an important focus on the
Chinese past and present, and Edward
Dreyer’s book contributes important
new history and analysis to that understanding. Studying the Chinese foreign
expeditionary armada of the early fifteenth century, Dreyer outlines a Chinese strategy and set of naval tactics
that are familiar to today’s naval officer.

Finally, the authors assess the degree to
which China’s military has met the strategic imperatives of its ancient strategists and modern leaders. They reach
the sobering conclusion that despite
China’s continuing difficulty in approaching Western technological and
even organizational levels, Taiwan’s importance to Chinese identity, strategic
value, and position as a bellwether of
national territorial integrity justify extraordinary expenditure of blood and
treasure. Moreover, China’s military
planners appear to believe that by investing selectively in asymmetric weapons, they can reconcile these conflicting
realities without fueling an arms race
and hence mutual insecurity. It is to be
hoped that a new generation in Beijing,
Taipei, and Washington, drawing on
Lewis’s and Xue’s research, will find the
collective wisdom to avert conflict that
would devastate all parties involved.

Starting in 1405 the eunuch Admiral
Zheng He led a series of seven voyages
from the shores of the Ming empire
into the South China Sea and Indian
Ocean. These voyages were made by
fleets larger than any the world had ever
seen; armadas of over two hundred vessels, the largest wooden vessels ever
constructed, carrying roughly thirty
thousand sailors and marine infantry.
Scholars and Chinese government historians have characterized these expeditions, which reached as far west as the
coast of Africa, as peaceful voyages of
discovery. Dreyer, however, disagrees.
He writes instead, “After thoroughly reviewing the primary Chinese sources, I
concluded that the purpose of the voyages was actually ‘power projection’ . . .
rather than mere exploration. Zheng
He’s voyages were undertaken to force
the states of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean to acknowledge the power
and majesty of Ming China and its
emperor.”

ANDREW S. ERICKSON

Naval War College

Dreyer, Edward L. Zheng He: China and the
Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405–1433. Old
Tappan, N.J.: Pearson Longman, 2006. 238pp.
$20.67
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The book is structured in a straightforward manner, chronologically moving
from Zheng He’s personal biography
and the background history of the voyages to the voyages themselves. While
not a professional naval architect,
Dreyer has obviously done his research.
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